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Abstract—Devices connected as a part of the Internet of
Things, and other connected devices, require secure mechanisms
to facilitate the propagation of Command & Control messages to
enable the remote management of the devices. The Secure Remote
Update Protocol (SRUP) provides a mechanism to facilitate the
formation of secure messages for transmission using common
techniques. This paper describes the details of, and motivations
behind, the creation of a Python wrapper for SRUP: and
describes a worked example of usage. By using pySRUP a
developer can integrate SRUP into their projects: with minimal
additional effort, and requiring them to write less code than
traditional unsecured alternatives.
Index Terms—MQTT; IoT; C2; Command & Control; Python;
Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential advantages of the Internet of Things (IoT)
are constrained by the plethora of examples of connected
devices which have been built using little or no security; or
using out-dated protocols. For example, research published
by cybersecurity company Kaspersky Lab in September 2018,
showed that over 75% of attacks [1] attempted against their
monitored honeypots, were attempting to exploit the fifty-year-
old Telenet protocol.
The Secure Remote Update Protocol (SRUP) [2], [3], at-
tempts to provide a solution to the problem of establishing
secure and authenticated communications to IoT devices, by
defining a protocol to enable Command and Control (C2)
messages to be securely passed between IoT devices and
C2 servers: using Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT) [4] as the application transport mechanism (and
using Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption to prevent
eavesdropping). The original C++ library implementation of
the protocol enables an IoT developer to focus on the device
and application — and not need to design and implement their
own security solution.
Although use of the SRUP protocol via the low-level
implementaion addresses the security concerns: it remains as
something that an applications developer is required to think
about, and explicitly include within their system design; and
despite the support from the library code, it remains somewhat
non-trivial to implement.
This paper proposes a solution, through the use of a conve-
nient code library; which enables a device developer to utilize
secure communications — without needing to be exposed to
the implementation details, and requires less code to be written
than would be required for a naı¨ve insecure solution.
II. BACKGROUND TO WORK
A. The requirements for secure C2 for the IoT
Security in the context of C2 messages for the IoT is
composed of three key elements: authenticity, integrity, and
confidentiality.
1) Authenticity: Authenticity is the most important require-
ment for any C2 system. Before any device acts upon a
command message from a controller it is essential that the
device is able to verify that the command originates from a
valid source. Similarly, if a data message is received by a
controlling server it is necessary to be able to ascertain that
the message has originated from a valid device (and to identify
from which device it has been received).
2) Integrity: Techniques to validate the integrity of the
message enable the receiver to ascertain not only that the
message has originated from a valid sender; but also that
the message itself has not been tampered with (or otherwise
corrupted) during its propagation through the network. Estab-
lishing the integrity of a message also requires that attempts
by an attacker to retransmit a previously sent (and therefore,
originally valid) message (a so-called replay attack), can be
detected and prevented.
3) Confidentiality: It is often required that C2 messages
sent between controllers and devices, also be protected against
eavesdropping by an attacker. Whilst this is not a universal
requirement, it is commonly required; and protecting the con-
fidentiality of a message by encryption also provides additional
challenges to an attacker attempting to inject malicious data
into the system.
B. Overview of SRUP
The SRUP protocol provides an efficient binary payload
to be delivered to the device in question using MQTT. This
MQTT message payload consists of a byte-string containing
details of the SRUP message type, the parameters associated
with the message, details of the sender; and a digital signature.
Devices subscribe to MQTT topics associated with their iden-
tity, and use these to receive and publish messages pertaining
to the device. A C2 server will subscribe to multiple topics:
one for each of the devices that it controls; as well as a server
topic — used by devices wishing to initiate communications
with a new server.
The use of SRUP addresses the first two of the security
requirements (authenticity and integrity) by the use of message
signatures generated using asymmetric cryptographic algo-
rithms, such as RSA [5]; and addresses the third through the
use of TLS encrypted MQTT [6].
III. MOTIVATION
A. Types of attack against the IoT
There are three major classes of attack against IoT devices:
attacks to obtain the data from an IoT device; attacks to
damage (or deny use of) the IoT device itself; and attacks
against a device, in order to use it as an attack vector against
another target.
1) Attacks on data: Attacks against the data within an IoT
system take two forms: attacks to attempt to exfiltrate sensitive
data from the system; and attempts to inject false data into the
system.
A partial resolution to attacks against the data is provided
by the use of encryption to protect the data in transit. By using
suitable encryption algorithms, interception of the content of
data flowing over a network can be prevented. Effective use
of encryption also requires a systemic approach to security
to protect the data. In addition to protecting the data in
transit, it is necessary to prevent unauthorized users exploiting
legitimate access mechanisms to obtain or generate data: such
as by using authenticated access control. It is also required to
protect against attempts to directly compromise the data-stores
themselves (such as by limiting the available attack surface,
and hardening interfaces).
Preventing an attacker from injecting false data into the
system, can similarly be protected against by the use of
asymmetric encryption; but again also requires mechanisms
to protect against unauthorized access to systems.
Lastly it must be recognised that in the event that a device
is covertly physically compromised, it is almost impossible to
prevent an attacker from using it to obtain or inject data. If
(or when) such an attack is detected, however, mechanisms
can be used to limit further access — such as remotely
deauthorizing the device, and preventing it from reconnecting
with the system — and it may also be possible to audit stored
data to remove records which have come from a compromised
device.
2) Attacks against the device: Attacks against the device,
with intent to damage or deny its use; or to damage deny
use of other physical systems connected to the device are
a growing threat for the IoT [7]. IoT devices (or connected
hardware) may be physically damaged (such as was seen with
the Stuxnet malware [8]), or may be rendered permanently
unusable by corrupting their firmware [9]. This class of attack
also includes crypto-ramsonware attacks such as WannaCry
[10]; which although are not currently widespread, have the
potential to be highly damaging [11].
Attacks against network infrastructure (such as denying use
of Radio Frequency (RF) communications through the use of
jamming or other types of electronic RF attack) may be used to
deny use of a network-connected device; and physical attacks
against the device my damage or destroy it. Mitigation against
both of these threats require physical security guarantees for
the operating environment — and as such, are beyond the
scope of a software solution, and are therefore not considered
further in this paper.
3) Attacks exploiting the device: Attacks against a device
may not necessarily have the device itself as the intended end-
point; but rather use the device as an attack vector to target
another resource. This has been very commonly seen within
the IoT — such as with the Mirai malware [12], used to control
a botnet of IoT devices to coordinate a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack against the Internet’s Domain Name
System (DNS) in 2016.
B. Perception that security is hard
The proliferation of IoT devices on the market with little
or no meaningful security associated with them [13], clearly
shows the extent to which adequate security is not regarded
as a high-priority for IoT device designers. Implementing a
secure system from scratch not only requires a high degree
of understanding of security principles and components; but
also requires a significant additional effort over and above
an insecure (or unsecured) configuration. As such, even if a
device developer wants to create a secure device, there is a
significant barrier to entry.
C. The rise of “high-productivity” programming
Software development today is increasingly about assem-
bling extant components into assembled applications. This
trend is exemplified by programming languages such as
JavaScript and Python — where developers use package
management tools to automatically retrieve and install libraries
and their dependancies from which the application software is
composed. This approach allows for far higher productivity
from a software developer: allowing them to concentrate on
the features required within the software, and not on the
implementation of the lower-level capabilities required to
enable them.
This progression, of increasing abstraction from the un-
derlying hardware, is the continuation of a trend from the
earliest days of computing. Today, almost no-one would con-
sider developing serious application software by directly using
machine instructions or writing assembly code mnemonics;
and intermediate level languages (such as C or C++) are
increasingly only used where speed of execution is critical.
Python is often ranked as the ‘top’ programming language in
surveys of real-world language use. [14].
IV. ABOUT PYSRUP
A. Description of the pySRUP library
The pySRUP library provides a Python implementation of
both the underlying SRUP protocol, and of the necessary
MQTT and Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTPS)
clients required to handle the message receipt and delivery;
as well as the initial key exchange and device registration.
Once the back-end services (such as the MQTT broker, and
secure key exchange service) required to enable this are in
place (see Section V); developers can consume the services
they provide, without needing to implement their own device-
side client software.
For example, a developer wishing to construct a device
which can handle a SRUP action message — will simply
write a function defining what (from the device’s perspective)
should occur on receipt of such a message: and provide this
as a call-back function to the pySRUP client class object. The
underlying library code will then handle the detailed imple-
mentation of the messaging process (such as receiving the
underlying MQTT message, validating the message signature,
and checking for an attempted replay attack). If the message
passes the validation tests, then the details of the message will
be passed handler function to perform the correct action.
For more complex message types (such as those used to
perform a software update operation), the library can automat-
ically handle the intermediate message exchanges: notifying
the application software only when the retrieval and validation
of the update data has been completed — and the activation
signal has been received.
The library itself is structured in the form of two parts;
firstly a simple Python wrapper for the extant C++ library
implementation of SRUP, and on top of this, a pure Python
implementation of the higher-level functionality (including
interfacing with the Paho [15] MQTT client; and the Requests
[16] HTTPS client). This abstracted library encapsulates the
functionality in the form of two Python classes: providing
distinct implementations for both devices, and controlling C2
server applications.
The advantage of this hierarchical approach is one of
simplicity. It maximizes reuse of the extant C++ library code,
and ensures that the best use is made of the high-productivity
features of the Python language, and its ecosystem of pre-
existing libraries.
Fig. 1. A photograph of an example IoT device, consisting of a Raspberry
Pi Zero W and a custom circuit board.
B. Ease of use comparison
Although the C++ library provides a full implementation of
the SRUP protocol, in order to use it from C++, the developer
must implement their own interface between it and an MQTT
library. Similar the library does not provide any interface
to the key exchange service (but rather assumes that the
necessary key exchange has already taken place outside of the
functionality of the library code). By contrast, when using the
pySRUP library: such steps are handled automatically, so that
a developer only needs to implement their own functionality.
In order to demonstrate the concept, an example IoT device,
consisting of a Raspberry Pi Zero W — and a custom circuit-
board with a number of Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) — was
constructed. This is shown in figure 1.
The device-side software for this device (which includes
handling ACTION and DATA messages, as well as the ability
to remotely update the software); was implemented in less than
100-lines of Python code, when using the pySRUP library (and
over 20% of that code is preamble and setup for the General
Purpose Input / Output (GPIO) to control the LEDs). Figure
2 illustrates the brevity of the code required to implement the
device.
Fig. 2. The device-side Python code for a simple IoT application, using the
SRUP protocol to control a device: implemented using the pySRUP library.
When using a solution utilizing pySRUP, a developer is
required to write less code than would be necessary to im-
plement a simple unsecured communication model: because
the pySRUP library takes care of all of the low-level setup of
the MQTT client. A developer implementing even a simple
MQTT-based communications model by directly using the
same Paho MQTT library, would be required to explicitly
connect to the broker and subscribe to suitable topics: and
implement their own on_message() handler to parse the
MQTT messages. When a message is received, this would
be required identify the correct behaviour to perform. Both
of these elements require considerably more code and more
consideration than an approach based on pySRUP.
C. Why Python?
Given the prevalence of Python in the current software
trends, its ease of use; and the ease to which Python can
interface with C/C++ code — it is a very good fit for a system
such as described here.
By interfacing with the existing C++ library, rather than
reimplementing it in Python, it is possible to both reuse the
code — and also to allow the lower-level work (such as
marshalling & demarshalling bytes, and calculating & check-
ing cryptographic signatures) to be performed in a language
optimized for speed and efficient byte-level operations on data.
Extant MQTT and Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
libraries (such as Paho and Requests) make it extremely easy to
interface with the backend systems; and utilizing cryptographic
libraries such as PyCryptodome [17] make non time-critical
processes, such as key generation, simple to implement.
V. A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE, CONTAINERIZED,
MICRO-SERVICES ARCHITECTURE
A. Back-end Architecture
The back-end architectural requirements for a system using
SRUP are straightforward. The requirement is only for an
MQTT broker; and an HTTPS web application to facilitate
the key exchange. In practice it is expected that in most
applications the C2 service would also be delivered as a part
of the back-end web services.
There needs to be close coupling between the MQTT broker
and the key exchange service if TLS is being used to encrypt
the MQTT traffic. It is necessary, not only to ensure that the
key exchange service is also issuing access keys to be used
when establishing a secure connection to the broker; but also
to ensure that the broker is configured only to permit devices
to access their own topics. Without this constraint, the security
of the configuration could be easily by-passed by an attacker,
registering via the key exchange service (to obtain an access
key) — and then using it to subscribe to the topics associated
with other devices. Most MQTT brokers support the concept
of an Access Control List (ACL) — which constrains which
topics a device may subscribe and / or publish to.
The MQTT broker can be configured to only permit MQTT
clients presenting a valid X.509 [18] certificate, which has
been issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) with a common
trust to the CA used to sign the certificate used by the broker.
To further restrict access on a per-topic basis, the certificate
can be issued with the Common Name (CN) field set to equal
the device’s unique identifier (a 128-bit Universally Unique
Identifier (UUID) value assigned to the device, as a part of the
registration & key exchange phase). The broker can then use
this CN data as the broker access username; and the ACL can
then be easily configured to restrict read access to topics, on
the basis of this username. The ACL uses a wildcard system:
such that all devices connecting with valid certificates, may
only access their own individual topics.
In order to permit devices to contact a new C2 server, for
the purposes of joining a new C2 node — devices must also
be granted write-only access to topics associated with servers.
Fig. 3. A diagram showing the required back-end architecture for a system
using the SRUP protocol
Although the MQTT standard does not support error report-
ing when a device attempts to subscribe to a disallowed topic:
the broker’s ACL will prevent communications from being
received by received by an unauthorized device.
B. Towards containerization
Although the current version of the SRUP code contains
the pySRUP library, and an implementation of the key ex-
change service: an end-user is required to construct their
own back-end services. It is proposed to provide, in the
future, a reference implementation of the back-end in the form
of a series of Docker containers. Docker [19] is the most
widespread containerization system in use today, and using
such a containerized approach eliminates the need for an end-
user to need to deploy and correctly configure their own broker
and other services. Using a model where the pre-configured
broker, and the key exchange service are implemented as
discrete containers is consistent with a modern trend for
cloud-native, micro-service based architectures. For ease of
management these containers (together with other additional
functionality which may be required: such as a web-based
C2 web application, or a HTTPS web server to be used as a
part of the software update process) may be orchestrated for
automated deployment using a Kubernetes pod [20].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced the pySRUP library, and has shown
how this can be used in order to facilitate rapid development
of Python-based IoT devices. We have shown how efficiently
an implementation of a simple, highly secure, example appli-
cation may be created using pySRUP; and we have shown that
the quantity of code that a developer is required to write in
order to utilize SRUP is equivalent to (or even less-than) the
code required to implement an unsecured solution.
The work to-date has all been implemented using Raspberry
Pi based systems: but the code should be compatible with any
CPython based implementations. Further work is underway to
assess the feasibility of porting SRUP and the pySRUP library
to the MicroPython framework — in order to facilitate its use
on lower-level, microcontroller-based, devices.
In order to encourage use of the SRUP protocol, all of the
code associated with this research has been released as open
source source, released under the terms of the MIT Licence.
The full version of the application code shown in figure 2
can be obtained from:
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2575652
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